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TORT LAW-New Mexico Holds Corporations Liable for
Punitive Damages Based Upon the Actions of Managerial
Agents: Albuquerque Concrete Coring Co. v. Pan Am
World Services, Inc.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Albuquerque Concrete Coring Co. v. Pan Am World Services, Inc.,,
the New Mexico Supreme Court held a corporation liable for punitive
damages based on an employee's misconduct when the employee was
acting in his "managerial capacity." ' 2 Before Albuquerque Concrete, New
Mexico courts only assessed punitive damages against corporations for
acts by executives with "whole executive power." 3 By adopting the managerial capacity criterion, the supreme court expanded the class of agents
whose acts are considered the acts of a corporation when assessing punitive
damages. This Note outlines the Albuquerque Concrete decision in its
historical context, examines the court's rationale, and explores the implications of the court's decision.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Albuquerque Concrete Coring Company (ACC) contracted with Pan
American World Services (Pan Am) to perform work at a Los Alamos
National Laboratory construction site. 4 During the construction, ACC
encountered conditions that made its work more difficult and expensive
than specified in its subcontract. ACC requested a fee adjustment from
Pan Am, the general contractor. Pan Am initially responded that it would
investigate the problem and make contract adjustments after the job's
completion. ACC, however, was not satisfied with Pan Am's response
and continued to request a fee adjustment. After a series of failed
negotiations, ACC sued Pan Am for breach of contract. The district
court awarded ACC $66,500 in compensatory damages and $133,000 in
punitive damages.
The district court held Pan Am liable for punitive damages based upon
the actions of William D. Adams, a Pan Am manager. 5 The court found

1. 118 N.M. 140, 879 P.2d 772 (1994).
2. Id. at 146, 879 P.2d at 778.
3. See Cornell v. Albuquerque Chemical Co., 92 N.M. 121, 126-27, 584 P.2d 168, 173-74 (Ct.
App. 1978); Couillard v. Bank of New Mexico, 89 N.M. 179, 184, 548 P.2d 459, 464 (Ct. App.
1976).
4. Albuquerque Concrete, 118 N.M. at 142-43, 879 P.2d at 774-75. All subsequent factual
references in this section refer to this citation, unless otherwise cited.
5. The court assumed the following factual matters based upon record and transcripts: (1)
Adams held the title of Administration Manager; (2) he supervised the Contract Administrator and
reported to the Pan Am Vice-President apparently in charge of Los Alamos operations; and (3)
Adams testified that he was in "upper management" and it was his responsibility to administer
contractual problems like the one with ACC. Id.
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that Mr. Adams' conduct included "material misrepresentations" and
"bad faith." Specifically, the district court found that Adams intentionally
made false statements to ACC in order to coerce it into finishing the
job when he (1) threatened to "blackball" ACC from all future government contract work; (2) threatened to hold ACC liable for the costs
of job completion if it did not finish the job; and, (3) persuaded ACC
to perform additional work that Pan Am did not intend to pay for.
Finally, the trial court found that Pan Am acted in bad faith when
Adams denied ACC's requested contract adjustment. 6 Adams denied the
adjustment because the invoice did not include necessary documentation.
The district court found, however, that Adams possessed the documentation and ignored it. Pan Am appealed the punitive damages award to
the Supreme Court of New Mexico.
In Albuquerque Concrete, the New Mexico Supreme Court upheld the
punitive damages award against Pan Am based upon Adams' misconduct.,
The court found that Adams' discretionary authority as a Pan Am
manager established corporate participation in his misconduct.8 Therefore,
Pan Am was liable for punitive damages based upon Adams' actions.
III.

BACKGROUND

Courts award punitive damages to punish and deter the outrageous
conduct of wrongdoers. 9 Under certain circumstances, courts impose punitive damages on corporations based upon the acts of their employees. 0
Courts apply one of two rules to determine corporate liability for punitive
damages based upon employee misconduct: (1) the scope-of-employment
rule, or (2) the complicity rule." These two rules are based upon competing
legal doctrines.
A.

Scope-of-Employment Rule
A minority of United States jurisdictions apply the "scope-of-employment rule.' ' 2 This relatively liberal rule holds a corporation liable for
the acts of employees when the employees act within the scope of their

6. Court records indicate: (1) Adams instructed the Contract Administrator to inform ACC of
the adjustment denial; and (2) the Vice President "may have been carbon-copied" with a
written copy of the denial. Id.
7. Albuquerque Concrete, 118 N.M. at 145, 879 P.2d at 778.
8. Id.
9. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 2, at 9 (5th ed.
1984). Punitive damages are "given as an enhancement to compensatory damages because of [the]
wanton, reckless, malicious or oppressive character of acts complained of." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
390-91 (6th ed. 1990). See also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 255 (1984) (stating

that punitive damages "have long been a part of traditional state tort law"); Day v. Woodworth,
54 U.S. (13 How.) 362, 371 (1851) ("It is a well-established principle of the common law" that
juries may award punitive damages).
10. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES, § 80, at 282-84 (1935).
11. Philip H. Corboy, Vicarious Liability for Punitive Damages: The Effort to Constitutionalize
"Tort Reform", 2 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 2, 13 (1991).
12. See RICHARD L. BLATT ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO LAW

PRACTICE, § 8.2, at 114 (1991).

AND
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employment.' 3 It does not require ratification on the part of the employer.' 4 This rule views an agent's acts as the legal equivalent of the
corporation's acts.' Courts applying the scope-of-employment rule stress
deterrence as the purpose of punitive damages. 6 A 19th century case
articulated this rule's rationale:
A corporation is an imaginary thing. It has no mind but the mind
of its servants; . . . and it has no hands with which to act but the
hands of its servants .... All attempts therefore to distinguish between
the guilt of the servant and the guilt of the corporation; or the malice
of the servant or the malice of the corporation ... is sheer nonsense .... When it is thoroughly understood that it is not profitable
to employ careless and indifferent agents, or reckless and insolent
' 7
servants, better [employees] will take their places and not before." '
An important feature of this rule is that courts do not consider an
agent's rank within the corporation when assessing liability for punitive
damages.' Proponents of the "scope-of-employment rule" argue that it
(1) encourages corporate responsibility for corporate acts, (2) eliminates
the necessity of gathering evidence of wrongdoing that is in the custody
of the defendant, and (3) provides an opportunity for plaintiffs to act
"for the benefit of the public."' 9
B.

The Complicity Rule
A majority of United States jurisdictions apply the more conservative
''complicity rule.'' 20 This rule is based on the belief that an innocent
party should not be liable for punitive damages arising from a third
party's actions. 2' The complicity rule holds a corporation liable for punitive
damages only when corporate agents who possess a requisite level of
authority affirm or participate in the misconduct. 22 The complicity rule

13. Corboy, supra note 11, at 16-17. In other words, respondeat superior applies to both
compensatory and punitive damages.
14. Id.
15. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, at 284.
16. KEETON ET AL., supra note 9, at 13 (exemplary damages levied against a railway carrier for
the purpose of deterring future conduct were warranted when a brakeman assaulted and grievously
insulted a passenger (citing Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry. of Canada, 57 Me. 202 (1869)).
17. Id.at 223-224.
18. See Mobile & O.R. Co. v. Seals, 13 So. 917 (Ala. 1893) (holding that a trespasser on a
railroad train may recover exemplary damages for a wanton, willful and intentional wrong committed
by a brakeman within the scope of his employment). "The president of a railway corporation is
no more or less its agent than a brakeman on one of its trains ... [A] brakeman is as fully
authorized to act for the company, within the range of his employment, as the president is within
the limits of his office." Id. at 919. See also Stroud v. Denny's Restaurant, Inc., 532 P.2d 790
(holding that a trial court appropriately awarded punitive damages against a coffee shop chain for
malicious prosecution when a cook, acting within the scope of his employment, executed a citizen's
arrest upon a customer who refused to pay for unbuttered toast).
19. Corboy, supra note 11, at 18-20.
20. Blatt, supra note 12, at 114. See also Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury
Cases, 21 OHIo ST. L.J. 216, 221 (1960) (using the term "complicity rule" first).
21. See Corboy, supra note 11, at 13; see also MCCORMICK, supra note 10, at 284.
22. Morris, supra note 20, at 221.
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exists in two main versions, a conservative version known as the "wholeexecutive-power rule," and a more moderate version known as the "Re-

statement rule."
1. The Whole-Executive-Power Rule
The whole-executive-power rule holds corporations liable for punitive
damages only when very high ranking executive officers authorize, par-

ticipate in, or ratify misconduct. 23 The whole-executive-power rule focuses

authority at the very top of the corporate hierarchy.2 This rule usually
requires that the corporation's chief executive officer, or the vice-president

acting2 in the C.E.O.'s absence, authorize or participate in the misconduct. 1
A 19th century case, Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway v.
Prentice,26 articulated the rationale of the rule. In Lake Shore, the United
States Supreme Court noted that exemplary or punitive damages are
awarded to punish the offender, not to compensate the victim. 27 Therefore,
courts should only uphold such awards against those who participate in
the misconduct. 2 According to Lake Shore, only those holding essentially
plenary "whole executive power" should be treated as representing the
29
intent, and therefore the participation, of the corporation itself.
2. The Restatement Rule
The Restatement rule holds corporations liable for the acts of agents

under a wider variety of circumstances. 30 This is the most common form
of the complicity rule. 3' It contains four subsections that describe actions
by or circumstances under which a corporation or an employer may be

23. Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893).
24. See id. at 114.
25. See id.
26. 147 U.S. 101 (1893).
27. Id. at 114.
28. Id. at 107. In other words, it is inappropriate to assess punitive damages against innocent
third parties.
29. Id.at 109.
30. See Corboy, supra note 11, at 24-25. The Restatement rule states:
§ 909. Punitive Damages Against a Principal
Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or other principal
because of an act by an agent if, but only if,
(a) the principal or a managerial agent authorized the doing and the manner of
the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial agent was reckless in
employing or retaining him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope
of employment, or
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or approved the
act.
Corboy, supra note 11, at 25 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1979)). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C (1971), which is identical to section 909 in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. Future citations are to the Restatement (Second) of Torts only.
31. See Corboy, supra note 11, at 24-25.
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held liable for punitive damages based upon the actions of an employee. 2
Like other forms of the complicity rule, the Restatement rule does not
assess punitive damages against an employer who is personally innocent.3 3
However, within its various subsections, the Restatement rule does hold
an employer liable who authorizes, ratifies, or approves employee misconduct, or who recklessly employs or retains an unfit employee. 3 4 In
addition, the Restatement rule holds employers directly liable for the
misconduct of managerial employees who are acting within the scope of
their employment, or who approve the wrongful act while acting as a
managerial agent.35
The Restatement's "managerial capacity" criterion holds corporations
36
vicariously liable for the acts of a specific class of employee: managers.
The Restatement rule seeks to balance the two policy goals of protecting
innocent third parties and encouraging the responsible3 7 delegation of authority that is necessary within modern corporations.
C. Corporate Liability for Punitive Damages in New Mexico
Prior to Albuquerque Concrete, New Mexico courts applied the wholeexecutive-power form of the complicity rule.3" The New Mexico Supreme
Court first applied the complicity rule in Stewart v. Potter39 in 1940. In
Stewart, the court rejected the scope of employment rule and embraced
the complicity rule rationale found in Lake Shore.40 The court reversed
a punitive damages award when it found no evidence that a car dealer
had authorized, ratified, or participated in his agent's fraudulent sale of
a used car as new. 4' In 1957, the court applied the' complicity rule to
a corporation in Sanchez v. Securities Acceptance Corp.42 Without explicitly adopting the "whole executive power" language, the court referred
to the corporate culpability and employee authority concerns articulated
in Lake Shore. 4 3 The Sanchez court stated that liability required sufficient
employee authority to constitute corporate ratification, authorization or
participation in the misconduct. 44

32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909; see also supra note 30.
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 cmt. b.
34. Id. § 909(a)-(b), (d). "It is, however, within the general spirit of the rule to make liable an
employer who has recklessly employed or retained a servant or employee who was known to be
vicious, if the harm resulted from that characteristic." Id. cmt. b.
35. Id. § 909(c)-(d).
36. Id. "Although there has been no fault on the part of a corporation or other employer,
imposition of punitive damages upon the employer serves as a deterrent to the employment of unfit
persons for important positions." Id. cmt. b (emphasis added).
37. See id.
38. See Samedan Oil Corp. v. Neeld, 91 N.M. 599, 601, 577 P.2d 1245, 1247 (1978); Sanchez
v. Securities Acceptance Corp., 57 N.M. 512, 516, 260 P.2d 703, 707 (1953).
39. 44 N.M. 460, 104 P.2d 736 (1940).
40. Id. at 464, 104 P.2d at 740.
41. Id. at 461, 104 P.2d at 737.
42. 57 N.M. 512, 512, 260 P.2d 703, 703 (1953). In Sanchez, the supreme court reversed a
punitive damages award for wrongful taking and false imprisonment resulting from an employee's
tortious conduct when he repossessed a car. Id. at 518, 260 P.2d at 709.
43. Id.
44. Id.at 515, 260 P.2d at 706.
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In 1976, New Mexico officially adopted the Lake Shore "whole executive45
power" language when assessing punitive damages against a corporation.
In Couillard v. Bank of New Mexico,46 the court reversed a punitive
damages award levied against a parent bank when it found that the
manager of a branch
bank did not possess the whole executive power
47
of the parent bank.
Two years later, in Cornell v. Albuquerque Chemical Co.,48 the New
Mexico Supreme Court assessed punitive damages against a corporation
based upon the fraudulent actions of the company's vice-president. 49 The
court found that the vice-president wielded the whole executive power
of the company because he controlled all of the company's operations.50
The vice-president was the only officer who performed any executive
duties of this family business. 5'
Prior to Albuquerque Concrete, New Mexico courts consistently applied
the whole-executive-power rule when assessing punitive damages against
corporations. In 1978, however, one New Mexico Supreme Court justice
called for adoption of the managerial capacity standard in the case of
Samedan Oil Co. v. Neeld.5 2 In Samedan, the supreme court reversed a
punitive damages award in a wrongful death action." The court found
no evidence of liability under New Mexico's whole-executive-power rule
when an improperly designed natural gas well vent system burst and
killed an employee.5 4 A district production foreman, employed by Samedan
Oil Company, designed the system and supervised its construction."
In the Samedan dissent, Justice Easley urged adoption of the managerial
capacity criterion from the Restatement (Second) of Agency.5 6 Justice
Easley noted that "considerable controversy and change" was occurring
in the area of liability for punitive damages in other jurisdictions. 7 The
justice argued that the law should penalize corporations when they fail
to control their managerial personnel.5 8 Justice Easley's dissent foreshadowed the court's decision in Albuquerque Concrete.

45. See Couillard v. Bank of New Mexico, 89 N.M. 179, 182, 548 P.2d 459, 463 (1976).
46. 89 N.M. 179, 548 P.2d 459 (1976).
47. Id. at 182-83, 548 P.2d at 462-63. The court considered the relationship between the parent
bank organization and the bank branch office to be a principal and agent relationship. The court
reasoned that as manager of the agent office serving the principal, the branch manager could not
possess the whole executive power of the parent organization (even though his title was "VicePresident"). Id.
48. 92 N.M. 121, 584 P.2d 168 (1978).
49. Id. at 126-27, 584 P.2d at 173-74.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 126, 584 P.2d at 173.
52. 91 N.M. 599, 603-04, 577 P.2d 1245, 1249-50 (Easely, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 603, 577 P.2d at 1249.
54. Id. at 600, 577 P.2d at 1246.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 604, 577 P.2d at 1250 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217(c)).
57. Samedan, 91 N.M. at 603, 577 P.2d 1249.
58. Id. at 604, 577 P.2d at 1250.
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RATIONALE

In Albuquerque Concrete, the New Mexico Supreme Court upheld the
punitive damages award against Pan Am based upon the conduct of
William D. Adams, a Pan Am manager.5 9 The court applied the Restatement managerial capacity criterion and found that Adams' discretionary authority as a Pan Am manager established corporate participation
in his misconduct.60 In reaching its decision, the court considered the
arguments of both ACC and Pan Am, and ultimately chose its own
path.
A.

Applicability of Punitive Damages to Adams' Conduct
When concluding that Adams' conduct merited punitive damages, the
court noted that punitive damages are appropriate "when the defendant's
actions are malicious, fraudulent, oppressive, or committed recklessly with
a wanton disregard for plaintiff's rights." ' 61 The court reasoned that the
purpose of punitive damages is to punish and deter misconduct. 62 The
court further reasoned that punitive damages require a culpable mental
state on the part of the offending party. 6 The court found substantial
evidence of Adams' culpable mental state and held that his conduct
merited a punitive damages award.6
B. Pan Am's Liability for Punitive Damages Based on New Mexico's
Complicity Rule
In Albuquerque Concrete, the supreme court stated that the "central
issue [of the] case [was] whether Adams' conduct [could] be imputed to
Pan Am." ' 65 The court declared that in New Mexico a principal is liable
for punitive damages if it "authorized, ratified, or participated" in the
culpable acts of its agent." Because the district court made no specific
findings or conclusions regarding whether Pan Am's conduct fell within
67
this rule, the supreme court performed its own analysis.
The supreme court considered three ACC arguments for imputing
Adams' conduct to Pan Am: 68 (1) that the district court's findings that
Pan Am "acted through its duly authorized employees" constituted corporate participation; 69 (2) that Pan Am ratified Adams' acts by acqui-

59. Albuquerque Concrete Coring Co. v. Pan Am World Serv., Inc., 118 N.M. 140, 145-46,
879 P.2d 772, 777-78 (1994).
60. Id. at 146, 879 P.2d at 778.
61. Id. at 143, 879 P.2d at 775 (citing Romero v. Mervyn's, 109 N.M. 249, 255, 784 P.2d 992,
998 (1989)).
62. See id. (citing McGinnis v. Honeywell, Inc., 110 N.M. 1, 9, 791 P.2d 452, 460 (1990)).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Albuquerque Concrete, 118 N.M. at 143, 879 P.2d at 775.
66. Id. at 146, 879 P.2d at 778. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
67. Id. at 143, 879 P.2d at 775.
68. See id. at 143-44, 879 P.2d at 775-76.
69. Id. This argument echoes the principles of the scope of employment rule. The court did
not directly refute this argument, but later applied the rule of managerial capacity to corporate
participation.
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escence when a vice-president received copies of the contract adjustment
denial; 70 and (3) that Pan Am ratified Adams' acts when it accepted the
benefits of the contract breach. 7 The court held ACC's second and third
arguments did not establish corporate ratification because the facts did
not establish a culpable mental state on the part of Pan Am. 72 Instead,
the court agreed with the agent-based liability argument asserted by Pan
Am.
The court, however, rejected Pan Am's claim that it was not liable
for punitive damages because Adams did not possess the whole executive
power of the corporation. 73 The court found the whole-executive-power74
criterion "[viery restrictive and ... impractical in today's business world."
The court noted that the rule only applies to a few members of the
corporation who hold plenary authority. 75 Instead, the court chose the
possesses
managerial capacity rule, which focuses on whether an agent
76
discretionary or policymaking authority for the corporation.
C. Acts of an Agent with Managerial Capacity Constitute Corporate
Participation
The court adopted the managerial capacity subsection of the Restatement
and held Pan Am liable for Adams' misconduct. 77 The court reasoned
that "when a corporate agent with managerial capacity acts on behalf
of the corporation . .. his acts are the acts of the corporation; [and]
the corporation has participated" in the agent's acts. 78 In applying this
rule, the court looked to other jurisdictions for a definition of "managerial
capacity."
The court drew on language from Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Mutual
Ins. Co.,79 in which the California Supreme Court stated that the agent's
level in the corporate hierarchy does not necessarily determine managerial
capacity.80 The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that the more
appropriate test is whether the agent has authority to set corporate policy

70. Albuquerque Concrete, 118 N.M. at 144, 879 P.2d at 776. The court acknowledged that a
corporation may authorize an agent's acts by acquiescence in those acts. Id. (citing Bank of Santa
Fe v. Honey Boy Haven, Inc., 106 N.M. 584, 587, 746 P.2d 1116, 1119 (1987)). However, the
court noted the record contained no indication that the vice-president had knowledge of Adams'
misconduct toward ACC. Id. at 144, 879 P.2d at 776. The court found that receipt of a contract
adjustment denial notice was insufficient to establish culpable knowledge on the part of Adam's
supervisors. Id.
71. Albuquerque Concrete, 118 N.M. at 144, 879 P.2d at 776. The court noted that accepting
the benefits of a breach of contract is not a sufficient basis for awarding punitive damages without
evidence of culpable knowledge or behavior. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Albuquerque Concrete, 118 N.M. at 145, 879 P.2d at 777.
76. Id. at 146, 879 P.2d at 778.
77. Id. at 146, 879 P.2d at 778.
78. Id.
79. 620 P.2d 141 (Cal. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 912 (1980).
80. Albuquerque Concrete, 118 N.M. at 145, 879 P.2d at 777 (citing Egan, 620 P.2d at 148).
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and make decisions regarding what to do and how to do it."1 Focusing

on language in Abshire v. Stoller, 2 the court followed the Illinois Court
of Appeals' definition of a managerial employee as one who "formulates,
determines and effectuates his employer's policies ... with discretion or
authority . . . independent of company consideration .... 3

The court noted that the rule of managerial capacity "retain[s] the
philosophy that corporations should not be liable for punitive damages
absent corporate culpability .. .

.""

The court also noted, however, that

the rule "tends to deter the employment of unfit persons for important
positions" and "encourage[s] their supervision." 85
The court affirmed that wrongdoing by managing agents who supervise
daily operations is sufficient to "trigger imposition of corporate liability
for punitive damages."8 6 The court acknowledged that the modern business
world requires large corporations to delegate control to managing agents
who do not possess upper-level executive authority.17 The court reasoned
that if managers in charge 'of daily operations cannot activate liability
for punitive damages, large corporations "could unfairly escape liability
...by virtue of their size." 88 According to the court, liability for punitive
damages should be based on "corporate responsibility for wrong doing,"
not the "ability to insulate top executives
. ",9
V. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS
In Albuquerque Concrete, the New Mexico Supreme Court moved from
an ultra-conservative rule to a less conservative rule for assessing punitive
damages against corporations. 90 It did so by incorporating the Restatement's managerial capacity criterion into the participation element of the
traditional New Mexico complicity rule. 91 As a result, New Mexico courts
will continue to hold corporations liable for punitive damages only when

81. Id.
82. 601 N.E.2d 1257 (I11.
App. Ct. 1992).
83. Albuquerque Concrete, 118 N.M. at 145, 879 P.2d at 777 (citing Abshire, 601 N.E. 2d at
1263 (quoting Kemner v. Monsanto Co., 576 N.E.2d 1146, 1157 (I11.
App. Ct.), cert. denied, 584
N.E.2d 130 (1991))).
84. Albuquerque Concrete, 118 N.M. at 146, 879 P.2d at 778.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Albuquerque Concrete, 118 N.M. at 146, 879 P.2d at 778.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See. id.
91. This new hybrid rule creates a rule that is roughly equivalent to the entire four sections of
the Restatement rule. See supra note 30. Subsection (a) of the Restatement rule refers to authorizing
the acts of an agent and subsection (d) of the Restatement rule refers to ratifying the acts of an
agent. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 909(a) (d). "Authorizes" and "ratifies" are explicitly
stated elements of the New Mexico common law complicity rule. See, e.g.,
Albuquerque Concrete,
118 N.M. at 145-46, 879 P.2d at 777-78. Subsection (b) refers to recklessly retaining an unfit agent.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909(b). This subsection can be compared to ratification of
an agent's acts through "acquiescence in or acceptance of the unauthorized acts of an agent."
Albuquerque Concrete, 118 N.M. at 144, 879 P.2d at 776 (citing Bank of Santa Fe, 106 N.M. at
587, 746 P.2d at 1119).
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they are found to ratify, participate in, or authorize the misconduct of
an agent. However, any employee with managerial capacity can now
ratify, participate in, or authorize that misconduct.
A.

The New Mexico Rule
New Mexico's new hybrid version of the complicity rule expands the
class of agents with sufficient authority to establish corporate participation
in misconduct. Before Albuquerque Concrete, only the actions of executives with plenary "whole executive power" could represent the intent
which constitutes participation by the corporation. 92 After Albuquerque
Concrete, those agents who act on behalf of the corporation in a managerial capacity have this authority..93
An agent with managerial capacity may now impute wrongdoing to a
corporation in two ways: (1) by ratifying or authorizing the misconduct
of a subordinate corporate agent; 94 or (2) by personally committing acts
of wrongdoing. 95 Essentially, this second form of imputing an agents'
acts to a corporation is a version of the scope-of-employment rule. 96 The
managerial capacity criterion creates a limited group of agents within the
corporation for whom the corporation is vicariously liable.
B.

More New Mexico Lawsuits Will Seek Punitive Damages
As a result of Albuquerque Concrete, New Mexico now subjects powerful corporations to punitive damages for the egregious acts of local
managers. In the future, New Mexico plaintiffs will arguably file more
lawsuits seeking larger punitive damages awards against corporations.
Hopefully, this change in the law will result in greater corporate responsibility toward local communities.
More New Mexico lawsuits will seek punitive damages after Albuquerque
Concrete for two reasons. First, plaintiffs can prove their cases more
easily. Plaintiffs will no longer need to gather certain evidence that is
in the hands of out-of-state corporate defendants. They can now sue
large multinational or out-of-state corporations for misconduct of local
managers without proving knowledge on. the part of superior out-of-state
officers .9
Second, plaintiffs will be more likely to pursue punitive damages suits
when there is a greater potential for recovery. The acts of local managers
alone can now give plaintiffs access to the deep pockets of the parent
company. 98 This will increase the likelihood of plaintiff success and will
arguably result in a greater number of lawsuits.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

Albuquerque Concrete, 118 N.M. at 144, 879 P.2d at 776.
id. at 146, 879 P.2d at 778.
generally supra notes 61, 76, 80-83, 86-89 and accompanying text.
generally supra notes 35-36, 78, 86-89 and accompanying text.
supra text accompanying notes 12-15 and 35-36.
supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
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Larger Punitive Damages A wards
New Mexico will assess larger punitive damages awards against corporations. The stated purpose of punitive damages in New Mexico is to
punish and deter future misconduct. 99 In order to punish and deter
misconduct on the part of a corporation, the award must be of sufficient
size to impact on the corporation's resources. The bigger the corporation,
the larger the award must be. After Albuquerque Concrete, juries will
more often consider the financial resources of an entire corporation,
rather than an individual, when determining the size of punitive damages.
Therefore, juries will arguably assess larger awards in order to produce
the required deterrent effect.
D. Greater Corporate Responsibility
Expanding liability for punitive damages to the managerial class may
serve New Mexico commerce by creating a corporate climate that is more
responsible. Policymaking employees will now bind their corporations for
outrageous, incompetent or malicious actions. This should benefit the
New Mexico business community.
For example, it will be harder for large businesses with greater financial
power to take advantage of small businesses. Indeed, the Albuquerque
Concrete case is an example of a small subcontractor who was bullied
into finishing a construction job by the threats and lies of a larger, more
powerful company. Adams' message to ACC was that if ACC did not
finish the job on Pan Am's terms, then (1) ACC would not get paid
(and even then Pan Am failed to pay the requested amount); (2) Pan
Am would sue ACC for the costs of job completion (and by implication
Pan Am had the resources to do so); and (3) Pan Am would "blackball"
ACC from government contracts in the future (and by implication Pan
Am had the connections and power to do this; ACC would then be cut
off from a major source of business in a state with a relatively small
private economy).x0 As a result of the decision in Albuquerque Concrete,
small businesses in New Mexico can now plan and run their affairs with
a greater expectation of good faith negotiations and keep agreements
when dealing with larger businesses.
With Albuquerque Concrete, New Mexico joins the majority of United
States jurisdictions that include the acts of managers within corporate
liability for punitive damages. Since a majority of states already hold
corporations liable for the acts of managerial agents, it is unlikely that
this change will discourage corporations from doing business in New
Mexico.' 0 1 The managerial capacity criterion will expand liability for
punitive damages awards in a controlled way that will not unduly burden
corporate financial reserves.

99. Albuquerque Concrete Coring Co. v. Pan Am World Serv., Inc., 118 N.M. 140, 143, 879
P.2d 772, 775 (1994).
100. Id. at 142, 879 P.2d at 774.
101. Id.
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CONCLUSION

The Albuquerque Concrete decision expands corporate liability for
punitive damages to include the actions of agents with managerial capacity.
Before this decision, New Mexico courts only assessed punitive damages
against corporations for acts by agents with whole executive power.
Albuquerque Concrete will increase the number of New Mexico lawsuits
that seek punitive damages against corporations and will result in more
and larger punitive damages awards. The more liberal New Mexico rule,
adopted in Albuquerque Concrete, should make corporations that conduct
business in New Mexico more responsible in their hiring and supervision
of local managers.
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